tion, which claims that the
likeness of the myths is vastly exaggerated and much more the work of
the scholar at his desk than of the honest worshipper; the historical
explanation, which suggests unrecorded proselytisms, forgotten
communications and the possible original unity of widely separated
nations; the theological explanations, often discrepant, one suggesting
caricatures of the sacred narrative inspired by the Devil, another
reminiscences of a primeval inspiration, and a third the unconscious
testimony of heathendom to orthodoxy;[161-1] and lastly the metaphysical
explanation, which seems at present to be the fashionable one, expressed
nearly alike by Steinthal and Max Mueller, which cuts the knot by
crediting man with "an innate consciousness of the Absolute," or as
Renan puts it, "a profound instinct of deity."
The philosophy of mythology, differing from all these, finding beyond
question similarities which history cannot unriddle, interprets them by
no incomprehensible assumption, but by the identity of the laws of
thought acting on similar impressions under the guidance of known
categories of thought. Nor does it stop here, but proceeds to appraise
these results by the general scheme of truth and error. It asks for
what psychological purpose man has so universally imagined for himself
gods--pure creations of his fancy;--whether that purpose can now or will
ultimately be better attained by an exercise of his intellect more in
accordance with the laws of right reasoning; and thus seeking to define
the genuine food of the religious desire, estimates the quality and
value of each mythological system by the nearness of its approach to
this standard.
The philosophy of mythology, starting with the wish or prayer as the
unit of religious thought, regards all myths as theories about the
unknown power which is supposed to grant or withhold the accomplishment
of the wish. These theories are all based upon the postulate of the
religious sentiment, that there is order in things; but they differ from
scientific theories in recognizing volition as an efficient cause of
order.
The very earliest efforts at religious thought do not rise to the
formation of myths, that is, connected narratives about supernatural
beings. All unknown power is embraced under a word which does not convey
the notion of personality; single exhibitions of power which threaten
man's life are supposed to be the doings of an unseen person, often o
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