the Witwatersrand.
No one in England talked (though the notion had crossed a few ambitious
minds) of pushing British dominion up to the Zambesi. The Transvaal
Republic was bankrupt and helpless, distracted by internal quarrels,
unable to collect any taxes, apparently unable to defend itself against
its Kafir enemies, and likely to be the cause of native troubles which
might probably spread till they affected all Europeans in South Africa.
There was some reason to believe that the citizens, though they had not
been consulted, would soon acquiesce in the change, especially when they
found, as they soon did find, that the value of property rose with the
prospect of security and of the carrying out of internal improvements by
a strong and wealthy power. Such was certainly the belief of Sir T.
Shepstone and of Lord Carnarvon, and it seemed to be confirmed by the
apparent tranquillity which the Boers exhibited.

So, indeed, they might have acquiesced notwithstanding their strenuous
love of independence, had they been wisely dealt with. But the British
government proceeded forthwith to commit three capital blunders.

The first of these, and the least excusable, was the failure to grant
that local autonomy which Sir T. Shepstone had announced when he
proclaimed annexation. The Volksraad which the people were promised was
never convoked; the constitution under which they were to enjoy
self-government was never promulgated. There was no intention to break
these promises, but merely a delay, culpable, indeed, but due to
ignorance of the popular Boer sentiment, and to the desire of the
Colonial Office to carry out its pet scheme of South African
confederation before conceding to the Transvaal such a representative
assembly as would have had the power to reject, on behalf of the people,
the scheme when tendered to them. Nor were matters mended when at last a
legislature was granted, to consist of some officials, and of six
members nominated by the Governor, for this made the people fear that a
genuine freely elected Volksraad would never be conceded at all.

The second blunder was the selection of the person who was to administer
the country. Sir T. Shepstone, who knew it well and was liked by the
Boers, was replaced by a military officer who had shown vigour in
dealing with local disturbances in Griqualand West, but was totally
unfit for delicate political work. As representative government had not
yet been introduced, his admin