overrule his own better judgment, to
the great detriment of the cause. Alone he was superb! Given equal
resources, the world has not seen a general with whom he could not
successfully be matched. In this particular juncture, fortunately for
the country, he insisted upon having his own way.
There were apparently but three alternatives before the council. The
first was a retreat with all speed down the river, leaving the heavy
baggage and artillery, and then crossing at Philadelphia if they could
get there in time. But this would be to abandon the whole colony of
New Jersey, to lose the results of the whole campaign, and leave the
enemy in fine position to begin again in the spring; and if this were
the end, they might better have stayed on the west side of the river.
Besides, successes were vital and must be had. Another retreat meant
disintegration and ruin, in spite of the lucky stroke at Trenton. The
second alternative was a battle where they stood, and that meant total
defeat,--a thing not to be considered a moment. The army must win or
die; and as dying could do no good, it had to win. A brilliant idea,
however, had occurred to the commander-in-chief, the man of brilliant
ideas. He communicated it to the council, where it instantly found
adherents, and objectors, too. It was the third alternative. A
circuitous road called the Quaker road, recently surveyed and just
made, led in a roundabout way from the rear of the camp toward the
Princeton road, which it entered two miles from that town.
Washington's plan was to steal silently away in the night by this road,
leaving bright fires burning to deceive the confident enemy, and press
with all speed toward Princeton, strike Cornwallis' rear-guard there at
daybreak with overwhelming force, crush it before that general could
retrace his steps, and then make a dash for the British supplies at New
Brunswick. If it were not practicable to reach that point, Washington
could take a position on the hills above Morristown, on the flank of
the British, and, by threatening their communications, force the
superior army to retreat and abandon the field, or else attack the
Americans in their intrenchments in the hills, with a probable result
even more disastrous to the attacking party than at Bunker Hill. It
was a conception as simple and beautiful as it was bold, brilliant, and
practicable.
But now the objectors began; it had been snowing, sleeting, and raining
for
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