asp capable of laying
hold of the truth.]
74
A letter _On the Foolishness of Human Knowledge and Philosophy_.
This letter before _Diversion_.
_Felix qui potuit ... Nihil admirari._[42]
280 kinds of sovereign good in Montaigne.[43]
75
Part I, 1, 2, c. 1, section 4.[44]
[_Probability._--It will not be difficult to put the case a stage lower,
and make it appear ridiculous. To begin at the very beginning.] What is
more absurd than to say that lifeless bodies have passions, fears,
hatreds--that insensible bodies, lifeless and incapable of life, have
passions which presuppose at least a sensitive soul to feel them, nay
more, that the object of their dread is the void? What is there in the
void that could make them afraid? Nothing is more shallow and
ridiculous. This is not all; it is said that they have in themselves a
source of movement to shun the void. Have they arms, legs, muscles,
nerves?
76
To write against those who made too profound a study of science:
Descartes.
77
I cannot forgive Descartes. In all his philosophy he would have been
quite willing to dispense with God. But he had to make Him give a fillip
to set the world in motion; beyond this, he has no further need of God.
78
Descartes useless and uncertain.
79
[_Descartes._--We must say summarily: "This is made by figure and
motion," for it is true. But to say what these are, and to compose the
machine, is ridiculous. For it is useless, uncertain, and painful. And
were it true, we do not think all philosophy is worth one hour of pain.]
80
How comes it that a cripple does not offend us, but that a fool
does?[45] Because a cripple recognises that we walk straight, whereas a
fool declares that it is we who are silly; if it were not so, we should
feel pity and not anger.
Epictetus[46] asks still more strongly: "Why are we not angry if we are
told that we have a headache, and why are we angry if we are told that
we reason badly, or choose wrongly?" The reason is that we are quite
certain that we have not a headache, or are not lame, but we are not so
sure that we make a true choice. So having assurance only because we see
with our whole sight, it puts us into suspense and surprise when another
with his whole sight sees the opposite, and still more so when a
thousand others deride our choice. For we must prefer our own lights to
those of so many others, and that is bold and difficult. There is never
this cont
|