iving to pour oil upon these troubled waters, to soothe
and reconcile these men who talked incessantly of "sacrifice" and
useless butchery. This was particularly the case with General
Clebourne's men, who so loved their gallant leader that, at his death,
revenge had almost replaced patriotism in their hearts.

I do not consider myself competent, nor do I wish to criticise the
generals who led our armies and who, since the war, have, with few
exceptions, labored assiduously to throw the blame of failure upon
each other. I have read their books with feelings of intense sorrow
and regret,--looking for a reproduction of the glories of the
past,--finding whole pages of recrimination and full of "all
uncharitableness." For my own part, I retain an unchanged,
unchangeable respect and reverence for all alike, _believing each to
have been a pure and honest patriot, who, try as he might, could not
surmount the difficulties which each one in turn encountered_.

A brave, _vindictive_ foe, whose superiority in numbers, in arms, and
equipment, and, more than all, _rations_, they could maintain
indefinitely. And to oppose them, an utterly inadequate force, whose
bravery and unparalleled endurance held out to the end, although
hunger gnawed at their vitals, disease and death daily decimated their
ranks, intense anxiety for dear ones exposed to dangers, privations,
all the horrors which everywhere attended the presence of the
invaders, torturing them every hour.

While yielding to none in my appreciation of the gallant General Hood,
there is one page in his book which always arouses my indignation and
which I can never reconcile with what I know of the history of the
Army of Tennessee, from the time General Hood took command to the
surrender. Truly, they were far from being like "dumb driven cattle,"
for _every man_ was "_a hero_ in the strife." It seems to me that the
memory of the battle of Franklin alone should have returned to General
Hood to "give him pause" before he gave to the public the page
referred to:

(_Extract._)

"My failure on the 20th and the 22d to bring about a general
pitched battle arose from the unfortunate policy pursued from
Dalton to Atlanta, and which had wrought 'such' demoralization amid
rank and file as to render the men unreliable in battle. I cannot
give a more forcible, though homely, exemplification of the morale
of the troops at that period than _by comparing the Army to a team_
w