Government allows it. Three-fourths of the
'demonstrations' that have taken place in Paris during the last year or
two have been simply 'got up' by professional agitators. The men who
start the shouting and the marching are paid for their services, the
tariff being as a rule two francs per demonstration. With 500 francs,
that is 20 l., one can get 250 men together. These are joined by as many
fools and a small contingent of enthusiasts, and then you have a rumpus
on the boulevards, and half the newspapers in Europe announcing on the
morrow: 'Serious Disturbances in Paris. Impending Revolution.' Some
people may ask, Where does the money for many of these demonstrations
come from? The answer is that it comes largely from much the same sources
as those whence General Boulanger's funds were derived--that is, from the
Orleanist party.

As for military insubordination, plotting, or anything of that kind, M.
Zola often pointed out to me that no general could effect a revolution,
for the simple reason that he could not rely on his men to follow him in
an illegal attempt. It was quite possible that now and again other
generals besides Boulanger had dreamt of overturning the Republic, but
they had not the means to do so. It was as likely as not that the officer
foolhardy enough to make the attempt would be shot in the back by some of
the Socialists among the rank and file. Boulanger no doubt could have
counted on a good many men and 'non-coms.,' as he was popular with them,
but few if any officers above the rank of captain would have followed
him.

To-day, moreover, intense jealousy still reigns among the French general
officers. There is not one among them of sufficient pre-eminence and
popularity to gather round him a large contingent of military men of high
rank for any political purpose. And this, of course--quite apart from the
opinions of the masses--largely makes for a continuance of the Republican
regime.

With a weak Government in office, one with a policy of drift, everything
may become possible; but, so long as foresight and vigilance are shown,
the Republic remains impregnable. If military malcontents become
obstreperous it is only necessary to treat them as General Boulanger was
treated.

I recollect hearing M. Yves Guyot, who was a member of the Cabinet which
put down 'the brave general on the black horse,' and who was also one of
the few French friends who visited M. Zola during his exile, give a brief
accoun