FREE BOOKS

Author's List




PREV.   NEXT  
|<   322   323   324   325   326   327   328   329   330   331   332   333   334   335   336   337   338   339   340   341   342   343   344   345   346  
347   348   >>  
se a resemblance between ourselves and the subject that suffers. Everywhere where this resemblance makes itself known, pity is necessary; where this resemblance is lacking, pity is impossible. The more visible and the greater is the resemblance, the more vivid is our pity; and they mutually slacken in dependence on each other. In order that we may feel the affections of another after him, all the internal conditions demanded by this affection must be found beforehand in us, in order that the external cause which, by meeting with the internal conditions, has given birth to the affection, may also produce on us a like effect. It is necessary that, without doing violence to ourselves, we should be able to exchange persons with another, and transport our Ego by an instantaneous substitution in the state of the subject. Now, how is it possible to feel in us the state of another, if we have not beforehand recognized ourselves in this other. This resemblance bears on the totality of the constitution of the mind, in as far as that is necessary and universal. Now, this character of necessity and of universality belongs especially to our moral nature. The faculty of feeling can be determined differently by accidental causes: our cognitive faculties themselves depend on variable conditions: the moral faculty only has its principle in itself, and by that very fact it can best give us a general measure and a certain criterion of this resemblance. Thus an idea which we find in accord with our mode of thinking and of feeling, which offers at once a certain relationship with the train of our own ideas, which is easily grasped by our heart and our mind, we call a true idea. If this relationship bears on what is peculiar to our heart, on the private determinations that modify in us the common fundamentals of humanity, and which may be withdrawn without altering this general character, this idea is then simply true for us. If it bears on the general and necessary form that we suppose in the whole species, the truth of this idea ought to be held to be equal to objective truth. For the Roman, the sentence of the first Brutus and the suicide of Cato are of subjective truth. The ideas and the feelings that have inspired the actions of these two men are not an immediate consequence of human nature in general, but the mediate consequence of a human nature determined by particular modifications. To share with them these feelings we must have a
PREV.   NEXT  
|<   322   323   324   325   326   327   328   329   330   331   332   333   334   335   336   337   338   339   340   341   342   343   344   345   346  
347   348   >>  



Top keywords:
resemblance
 

general

 
conditions
 

nature

 

feelings

 

consequence

 
determined
 

faculty

 
character
 
relationship

feeling

 

internal

 

subject

 

affection

 

determinations

 
modify
 

private

 

peculiar

 

common

 

altering


withdrawn

 

fundamentals

 
humanity
 

thinking

 
offers
 

accord

 
easily
 

grasped

 

lacking

 
impossible

simply
 

suffers

 

inspired

 

subjective

 

Everywhere

 

modifications

 

actions

 

suicide

 

Brutus

 

species


mediate

 

suppose

 

sentence

 
objective
 
greater
 

substitution

 

instantaneous

 

persons

 

transport

 
totality