their account[PH] place their
strength as low as 10,000, which may have meant prior to the arrival of
Hampden with the artillery and rear troops. The Royalist army is stated to
have possessed 1,000 horse and 4,000 foot more;[G256] in all 14,000 foot
and 4,000 horse and dragoons--but as very few troops were of full
compliment the numbers were no doubt over estimated. The _full_ strength
of a foot regiment was 1,200, of a troop of horse about 120[x26] and of
dragooners about the same number to each company.

The Red and the Blue Regiments of the King's foot were so named from the
colour of their uniforms, the former being the King's foot guards. In
cavalry, however, it was that the Royalist army was predominant--more so,
perhaps, from the quality of the material than from any superiority of
equipment, Prince Rupert's show troop being a prominent example. Cromwell,
in a speech before Parliament,[q] bore testimony on this point, explaining
his reconstruction of the army as having arisen from the fact that "such
base and mean fellowes," tapsters and serving men as they then had, not
being "able to encounter gentlemen that had honour and courage and
resolution in them, He strove to find such as had the spirit of God in
them."

Towards mid-day the royalist army had occupied the whole length of the
brow of the hill between the Sun Rising and Arlescot; the left wing at the
Sun Rising, the centre at about the point where the Round House now
stands[2] and the right wing at Knowle End, where the road to Kineton
descends the hill. Well had it been for the King had the advice of so able
a soldier as Earl Lindsay prevailed at the council of war over the more
impetuous policy of Rupert. He had the strong position of the hill crest,
with convenient roads for the rapid movement of troops, and, moreover,
natural advantages which would have masked those movements. Essex would
have hesitated to risk the assault of a position of such strength,
especially when defended by a force greater than his own. These advantages
were, however, abandoned for the more dashing policy of Rupert to descend
to the plain and at once give battle. It must not be forgotten, however,
that the knowledge of the enemy's artillery with part of the army being
far in the rear,[PB] but approaching with what speed they could, and the
difficulty of provisioning the army in a hostile district,[B] would give
weight to Rupert's counsel. Brilliant cavalry officer as he undoub