aring for the battle the French placed powerful forces in the
great fortress of Verdun, and also in and around the entrenched camp
of Paris. Their field army extended between the two from Paris through
La Ferte, Esternay, Sezanne, and Sommesous to Vitry-le-Francois, and
from thence bent northeastward to Verdun. Thus their two flanks were
strong and menacing and their center, about one hundred and eighty
miles in length, bent southward and was slightly concave.

It is evident that in this battle the Germans could gain nothing by
making their main attack against Paris or Verdun, but that if they
could rout the field army between the two, they might as an aftermath
sweep round behind each city and attack it from all sides, using for
the purpose the heavy artillery which had under similar circumstances
and with such celerity battered down Liege, Namur, Longwy, and
Maubeuge. Therefore, the logical thing was for the Germans to attempt
to break the French center. This operation was somewhat hazardous as
there was danger that the French might launch a powerful flank attack
from either Verdun or Paris. To attack the center was, in effect,
something like thrusting a dagger into a lion's mouth in the effort to
cut his throat. It was necessary to hold back the jaws Verdun and
Paris, whilst attacking the vulnerable throat at Fere Champenoise.

To accomplish this, Verdun was kept so busy by violent attacks made
upon three sides that its army had no time to think of any offensive
movement. The German defense against the French right thus in reality
took the form of an active attack, a feasible method because Verdun is
near the Franco-German frontier, being in fact less than forty miles
from the German fortress and mobilization center of Metz.

To protect their right from any flank attacks which might be hurled
against it from Paris, the Germans placed a strong army under von
Kluck in front of that city to hold the French left in check, as a
boxer in a clinch holds back his opponent's left arm. Von Kluck fought
his way to a position approximately defined by a line through Creil,
Senlis, Nanteuil-le-Haudouin, and Lizy-sur-Ourg. His cavalry advanced
even to Chantilly and Crecy. His army was not intended to have any
part in the main German offensive, its sole duty being to protect the
German right from any attack in flank which might be prepared and
launched from the entrenched camp of Paris. Von Kluck was not to
attack Paris, but to pr