ose to insinuate my
deficiency in military conduct in the subsequent transactions. Let my
relation of it be heard!

We marched on the 27th, in the morning, and the ice being by this time
chiefly destroyed, we met with little obstruction in passing. The last
division of the troops being embarked, and then crossing, we received
private information, that General Washington had re-crossed the river, and
returned to Newtown, in Pennsylvania, from whence he dates his letter, 27th
December, 1776, informing me of the particulars of the action at Trenton,
and which was not received, contrary to your assertion, till we had marched
above a mile on our way to Burlington; it was then read to the troops, who
were halted for this purpose. We had, however, before given full credit to
the first information of his having re-crossed; on which previous
information I called together the field officers, to consult what was then
best to be done. From this circumstance, Col. Hitchcock, and some others,
proposed returning to Bristol. I instantly declared my determination
against it, and recommended an attack upon Mount Holly, as from the
information we had of the force at that post, we might easily carry it, and
should then have a retreat open towards Philadelphia, if necessary. You
then, "_as a middle course_," advised our going to Burlington; in which
those who had at first proposed our return, joined in opinion. This was the
true cause of that hesitation you remarked with respect to me. Burlington
was in a position, in my judgment, very dangerous; as in case we should be
invested there, and the river impassable, we should be forced to submit at
discretion, for want of provisions, or hazard an action against troops
superior in discipline, and perhaps in number, if their whole force was
collected to that point. Having no other retreat open to us, but that over
the river, it was evident this could not be effected without the loss, at
least, of those who might be ordered to cover the retreat. Having passed
the river in open day, it was probable the enemy might be informed of it;
and, in that case, the post at Mount Holly reinforced. To determine whether
we should take a position, unanimously approved by the council, but which I
thought extremely dangerous; or adhere to my own plan, unsupported by a
single voice, was certainly a question that required more than a momentary
consideration, even for an officer, at this stage of the war. Being pressed