ed, not merely that it embraces
classes of objects or greater matters, but that nothing is too minute or
insignificant for its inspection.

Providence is usually divided in three divine acts, Preservation,
Co-operation and Government. 1. By preservation is signified the
causing of existence to continue. 2. Co-operation is the act of God
which causes the powers of created things to remain in being. It is not
pretended that the existence of the powers of the things are ever
separated, but only that they are distinguishable in mental analysis.
Co-operation varies with the nature of the objects towards which it is
exercised. 3. Government, as a branch of Providence, is God's
controlling all created things so as to promote the highest good of the
whole. To this end every species of being is acted upon in a way
confirmable to its nature; for instance, inanimate things by the laws of
physical influence; brutes according to the laws of instinct; and free
agents according to the laws of free agency. Moreover, as Providence has
respect to the nature which God has been pleased to design to each
various object, so, in common with every other divine act, it is
characterized by divine perfections. It displays omnipresence,
omniscience, omnipotence, holiness, justice, and benevolence. It has
been sometimes contended that Providence does not extend to all things,
or to unimportant events, and chiefly for four reasons. Such an
all-embracing providence, it is said, would (1) be distracting to the
mind of God; or (2) would be beneath His dignity; or (3) would interfere
with human freedom; or (4) would render God unjust in permitting evil to
exist. In reply to these objections against a providence controlling all
things without exception, it may be observed that the third and fourth
suggest difficulties which press equally, in fact, upon all hypothesis,
not only as to providence, but as to creation, and which shall be more
fully explained in the sequel.

As to the first objection, that the minutiae of the creation are so
multifarious as to confuse the mind of God, we are content to let it
refute itself in every mind which has any just sense of divine knowledge
and wisdom. The second objection, that some things are beneath God's
notice, if it be not a captious cavil, must result from pushing too far
the analogy between earthly kings and the King of kings. It is an
imperfection in human potentates that they need vicegerents; let us not
the