If they
cease to believe of their own accord they ought to be constrained by
force, in the application of which, though there may be considerable
difficulties at first, yet, these once overcome by a sufficient
unscrupulousness--veneration, security, tranquillity, and happiness
will follow. That, if a prince is constrained to make his choice, it
is better for him to be feared than loved; he should remember that all
men are ungrateful, fickle, timid, dissembling, and self-interested;
that love depends on them, but fear depends on him, and hence it is
best to prefer the latter, which is always in his own hands. The great
aim of statesmanship should be permanence, which is worth everything
else, being far more valuable than freedom. That, if a man wants to
ruin a republic, his proper course is to set it on bold undertakings,
which it is sure to mismanage; that men, being naturally wicked,
incline to good only when they are compelled; they think a great deal
more of the present than the past, and never seek change so long as
they are made comfortable.

He recommends a ruler to bear in mind that, while the lower class of men
may desert him, the superior will not only desert, but conspire. If such
cannot with certainty be made trustworthy friends, it is very clearly
necessary to put it out of their power to be enemies. Thus it may be
observed that the frequent insurrections in Spain, Gaul, and Greece
against the Romans were entirely due to the petty chiefs inhabiting
those countries; but that, after these had been put to death, everything
went on very well. Up to a certain point, it should be the grand maxim
of a wise government to content the people and to manage the nobles; but
that, since hatred is just as easily incurred by good actions as by bad
ones, there will occasionally arise the necessity of being wicked in
order to maintain power, and, in such a case, there should be no
hesitation; for, though it is useful to persevere in the path of
rectitude while there is no inconvenience, we should deviate from it at
once if circumstances so advise. A prudent prince ought not keep his
word to his own injury; he ought to bear in mind that one who always
endeavours to act as duty dictates necessarily insures his own
destruction; that new obligations never extinguish the memory of former
injuries in the minds of the superior order of men; that liberality, in
the end, generally insures more enemies than friends; that it is the
na