what have
we but a further indication that things are so ordained, that the
universe is so constructed, so to speak, that you cannot get the good
out of it unless you conform to moral law--in other words, that in the
long run wrong, virtue and happiness are reconciled? Well, but the
ordering of things, the ordaining of a course of things, what is this
but the work of intelligence? And therefore Bentham, no less than
Kant, contributes his quota to the universal conclusion that the moral
law implies theism in the sense explained. Wherefore, it may be added,
there is no reason whatsoever why a rational ethic such as has been
sketched should not avail itself of the unquestionable services of
experience in determining what is and what is not in conformity with
morality. If a man sees the world as one, and all intelligence as one,
he will be assured beforehand that things are so constituted that
mischief cannot permanently or ultimately befall him if he lives what
he knows to be _the life_. And, therefore, the considerations of pain
and pleasure, utility and mischievousness, are extremely serviceable
criteria whereby we are assisted in that codification of morality, in
that determining of what is good and what is evil, only it must ever be
pointed out that they are not the ultimate explanation or basis of
morality, which is built, not on any hedonistic or utilitarian
foundation, but on the reason in us, in the universe, which commands us
to live as offspring of that reason, or as Paul puts it from his point
of view, as "children of the light".

And, in explaining why pleasure and pain cannot be regarded as "the
sovereign masters" of ethic, we may add to the evidence for our
conclusion. It appears that Bentham and his school do not observe the
proprieties of language in identifying the moral good, the moral right,
with pleasure. The ideas are really incommensurate, as is well pointed
out in Schurman's monograph on the Kantian and the evolutionary ethics
of Spencer. The ethical "ought," the word which gives the keynote to
the whole science, does not and cannot mean what is "pleasurable,"
"serviceable," or "useful". The word essentially implies the "ideal,"
the conformity to a definite standard of right, the approximation
towards a goal or standard of conduct implicitly recognised as absolute
good. But the ideas of "pleasurable," "useful," and the like concern
the moment only; they merely suggest that man should secure