scape for the conscience of the King through
the side vent of "open questions," the direct influence of the Sovereign
upon the councils of the Administration may be clearly traced. There
were no other means of reconciling His Majesty to the appointment of a
Cabinet, demanded by the voice of the Parliament and the country. The
dilemma was obvious. There was no choice between the rejection of
Ministers who held certain doctrines adverse to His Majesty's
convictions, and compromise upon the points of difference. When it was
found impossible to conduct the Government of the kingdom with a Cabinet
that did not possess the popular confidence, the Sovereign was reduced
to the necessity of treating with men who did possess that confidence,
whether he agreed with them in opinion or not. In our own times, and
under most of the Sovereigns who have filled the throne since our
Constitution may be said to have been settled, there could be no great
difficulty in a case of this kind. Ministers undertaking office under
such circumstances would be responsible to the country for their policy,
and the Sovereign would feel himself at once relieved by that
responsibility from all further anxiety. But George III. took that
responsibility upon himself in reference to the great measures that
occupied the public mind; and when, by the exigency of circumstances,
Ministers were pressed upon him from whose views he dissented, he
accepted them upon conditions which restrained the action of the
Cabinet, as a whole, in certain directions, but left its members
individually free and unpledged. Such was the origin of "open
questions." It was a compromise on both sides; and of course it must
always depend upon the extent to which this compromise is carried, and
the necessity under which it is resorted to, whether it should be
regarded as a sacrifice of principle on the part of the Minister who
submits to it.

Another novelty originating in this reign, out of the same peculiar
state of things, and resting upon a similar theory of expediency, was
that of the formation of a Coalition Administration, in which party
differences were merged in a common agreement upon a general line of
policy. As considerable light is thrown upon this memorable incident in
the course of these volumes, it is unnecessary to dwell upon it here. It
will be abundantly elucidated in the proper place. For the present, it
is sufficient to refer to the junction, in a composite Ministry o