ntial
world, while the physical remains subordinate to it, or, in the language
of speculation, has no truth as against the spiritual--the final cause
of the world at large we allege to be the consciousness of its own
freedom on the part of Spirit, and, _ipso facto_, the reality of that
freedom. But that this term "freedom" is, without further
qualification, an indefinite, incalculable, ambiguous term, and that,
while what it represents is the _ne plus ultra_ of attainment, it is
liable to an infinity of misunderstandings, confusions, and errors, and
to become the occasion for all imaginable excesses--has never been more
clearly known and felt than in modern times. Yet, for the present, we
must content ourselves with the term itself without further definition.
Attention was also directed to the importance of the infinite difference
between a principle in the abstract and its realization in the concrete.
In the process before us the essential nature of freedom--which involves
absolute necessity--is to be displayed as coming to a consciousness of
itself (for it is in its very nature, self-consciousness) and thereby
realizing its existence. Itself is its own object of attainment and the
sole aim of Spirit. This result it is at which the process of the
world's history has been continually aiming, and to which the sacrifices
that have ever and anon been laid on the vast altar of the earth,
through the long lapse of ages, have been offered. This is the only aim
that sees itself realized and fulfilled, the only pole of repose amid
the ceaseless change of events and conditions, and the sole efficient
principle that pervades them. This final aim is God's purpose with the
world; but God is the absolutely perfect Being, and can, therefore, will
nothing other than Himself--His own will. The nature of His will--that
is His nature itself--is what we here call the idea of freedom,
translating the language of religion into that of thought. The question,
then, which we may next put, is What means does this principle of
freedom use for its realization? This is the second point we have to
consider.

(2) The question of the means by which freedom develops itself to a
world conducts us to the phenomenon of history itself. Although freedom
is, primarily, an undeveloped idea, the means it uses are external and
phenomenal, presenting themselves in history to our sensuous vision. The
first glance at history convinces us that the actions of men p