storical event was
that the artist intended to depict by the scrawl. I was astonished
at the sameness of our ideas. Cases like Canute and the waves, the
Babes in the Tower, and the like, were drawn by two and even three
persons at the same time, quite independently of one another,
showing how narrowly we are bound by the fetters of our early
education. If the figures in the above Table may be accepted as
fairly correct for the world generally, it shows, still in a
measurable degree, the large effect of early education in fixing our
associations. It will of course be understood that I make no absurd
profession of being able by these very few experiments to lay down
statistical constants of universal application, but that my principal
object is to show that a large class of mental phenomena, that have
hitherto been too vague to lay hold of, admit of being caught by the
firm grip of genuine statistical inquiry. The results that I have
thus far given are hotch-pot results. It is necessary to sort the
materials somewhat before saying more about them.

After several trials I found that the associated ideas admitted
of being divided into three main groups. First there is the imagined
sound of words, as in verbal quotations or names of persons. This
was frequently a mere parrot-like memory which acted instantaneously
and in a meaningless way, just as a machine might act. In the next
group there was every other kind of sense imagery; the chime of
imagined bells, the shiver of remembered cold, the scent of some
particular locality, and, much more frequently than all the rest
put together, visual imagery. The last of the three groups contains
what I will venture, for the want of a better name, to call
"histrionic" representations. It includes those cases where I either
act a part in imagination, or see in imagination a part acted, or,
most commonly by far, where I am both spectator and all the actors
at once, in an imaginary mental theatre. Thus I feel a nascent sense
of some muscular action while I simultaneously witness a puppet of
my brain--a part of myself--perform that action, and I assume a
mental attitude appropriate to the occasion. This, in my case, is a
very frequent way of generalising, indeed I rarely feel that I have
secure hold of a general idea until I have translated it somehow
into this form. Thus the word "abasement" presented itself to me, in
one of my experiments, by my mentally placing myself in a pantomi