to countermand the announced solemnities, and the Sulpician proposals
now passed without further difficulty. But this was far from
determining their fate. Though the aristocracy in the capital might
own its defeat, there was now--for the first time since the commencement
of the revolution--yet another power in Italy which could not be
overlooked, viz. the two strong and victorious armies of the proconsul
Strabo and the consul Sulla. The political position of Strabo might
be ambiguous, but Sulla, although he had given way to open violence
for the moment, was on the best terms with the majority of the senate;
and not only so, but he had, immediately after countermanding
the solemnities, departed for Campania to join his army. To terrify
the unarmed consul by bludgeon-men or the defenceless capital by
the swords of the legions, amounted to the same thing in the end:
Sulpicius assumed that his opponent, now when he could, would
requite violence with violence and return to the capital at the head
of his legions to overthrow the conservative demagogue and his laws
along with him. Perhaps he was mistaken. Sulla was just as eager
for the war against Mithradates as he was probably averse to the
political exhalations of the capital; considering his original spirit
of indifference and his unrivalled political nonchalance, there is
great probability that he by no means intended the coup d'etat which
Sulpicius expected, and that, if he had been let alone, he would have
embarked without delay with his troops for Asia so soon as he had
captured Nola, with the siege of which he was still occupied.

Marius Nominated Commander-in-Chief in Sulla's Stead

But, be this as it might, Sulpicius, with a view to parry the presumed
blow, conceived the scheme of taking the supreme command from Sulla;
and for this purpose joined with Marius, whose name was still
sufficiently popular to make a proposal to transfer to him the chief
command in the Asiatic war appear plausible to the multitude, and
whose military position and ability might prove a support in the
event of a rupture with Sulla. Sulpicius probably did not overlook
the danger involved in placing that old man--not less incapable than
vengeful and ambitious--at the head of the Campanian army, and as little
the scandalous irregularity of entrusting an extraordinary supreme
command by decree of the people to a private man; but the very tried
incapacity of Marius as a statesman gave a