a thing which is to come; when
he has learned a thing by experience which he avoids through memory and
the apprehension of its recurrence, is it instinct that guides his
conduct? When a monkey shows clearly by his actions that he is aware of
the relation between cause and effect, and acts in accordance therewith,
is it instinct or reason that guides him? If there be a point in the
order of Nature where reason became an acquired faculty, it is somewhere
far below the plane occupied by monkeys. Their power of reasoning is far
inferior to that of man, but not more so than their power of thinking
and expression; but a faculty does not lose its identity by reason of
its feebleness. When the same causes under the same conditions prompt
man and ape alike to do the same act in the same way, looking forward to
the same results, I cannot understand why the motive of the one should
be called reason, and that of the other called instinct. Scholars have
tried so hard to keep the peace between theology and themselves, that
they have explained things in accordance with accepted belief in order
that they might not incur the charge of heresy. To this end they have
reconciled the two extremes by ignoring the means, and making a
distinction without a difference on which to found it.

Whatever may be the intrinsic difference between reason and instinct, it
is evident to my mind that the same motives actuate both man and ape in
the same way, but not to the same extent. I am aware that many acts
performed by Simians are meaningless to them and done without a
well-defined motive. The strong physical resemblance between man and ape
often causes one to attach more importance to the act than it really
justifies. In many cases the same act performed by some other animal
less like man would scarcely be noticed. To teach an ape or monkey to
eat with knife, fork, cup and spoon, to use a napkin and chair, or such
like feats, does not indicate to my mind a high order of reason; nor it
is safe to judge the mental status of these creatures from such data.
When he is placed under new conditions and committed to his own
resources, we are then better able to judge by his conduct whether he
is actuated by reason or not.

[Sidenote: CONNECTING CAUSES AND EFFECTS]

In any simple act where a monkey can see the cause connected with, and
closely followed by, the effect, he is actuated by reason, and while he
may not be able to explain to his own mind a remote