had no remedy. This is no longer the law. When, however, a court is
asked to enjoin or stop a useful and lawful business in a place, the
court will inquire whether the business has long existed and the place
has grown up by reason of its existence. If this prove to be the case
a court will reluctantly interfere. Yet, if the business is actually
harmful to health or injurious to property, it will be enjoined
however great the loss may be to the owner.

While a land owner is not liable for a nuisance created on his land by
a stranger, whose acts cannot in any way be attributed to him, he is
liable for a nuisance resulting from a licensee's use of his property.
Thus, if a licensee by attaching a wire to a chimney converts it into
a nuisance to passers-by, the land owner who knowingly permits the
nuisance to continue will be liable for the damages that result. Nor
can one who has fouled a stream or the air, or who indulges in
disturbing noises, defend himself for doing these things by showing
that others did them before he began.

As a person acts at his peril in maintaining a nuisance, so is the
owner of trespassing cattle liable for all the harm done by them,
whether he knows of their disposition to do harm or not. But he is not
liable for harm done by them while they are driven along the highway
without negligence on the driver's part; nor is he liable for mischief
done by them to the person or personal property of one at other times
without knowledge of their viciousness or other proof of negligence.
Nor is he liable by the common law as an insurer against all damage
done by them when they escape from his land.

When vicious animals are kept for any purpose and are a menace to
human beings they are a nuisance. Hence, they may be killed without
incurring liability, and should they do damage their owner or
responsible keeper must answer for it. If the animal be a vicious dog,
the owner must exercise a degree of care commensurate with the danger
to others following his escape from custody, and must secure it from
injuring anyone who does not unlawfully provoke or intermeddle with
the animal.

By the early common law a person who started a fire, even for a
needful and lawful purpose, was responsible for the consequences. This
rule has been modified with time. "A person," says Burdick, "does not
start a fire on his land at his peril. If it spreads beyond his
premises and harms others his liability for the harm must be gr