the
danger continually before the mind.

(1) Reasoning should never be combined with the analysis of a document.
The reader who allows himself to introduce into a text what the author
has not expressly put there ends by making him say what he never
intended to say.[199]

(2) Facts obtained by the direct examination of documents should never
be confused with the results obtained by reasoning. When we state a fact
known to us by reasoning only, we must not allow it to be supposed that
we have found it in the documents; we must disclose the method by which
we have obtained it.

(3) Unconscious reasoning must never be allowed; there are too many
chances of error. It will be enough to make a point of putting every
argument into logical form; in the case of bad reasoning the major
premiss is generally monstrous to an appalling degree.

(4) If the reasoning leaves the least doubt, no attempt must be made to
draw a conclusion; the point treated must be left in the conjectural
stage, clearly distinguished from the definitively established results.

(5) It is not permissible to return to a conjecture and endeavour to
transform it into a certainty. Here the first impression is most likely
to be right. By reflection upon a conjecture we familiarise ourselves
with it, and end by thinking it better established; while the truth is,
we are merely more accustomed to it. This is a frequent mishap with
those who devote themselves to long meditation on a small number of
texts.

There are two ways of employing reasoning, one negative, the other
positive; we shall examine them separately.

II. The negative mode of reasoning, called also the "argument from
silence," is based on the absence of indications with regard to a
fact.[200] From the circumstance of the fact not being mentioned in any
document it is inferred that there was no such fact; the argument is
applied to all kinds of subjects, usages of every description,
evolutions, events. It rests on a feeling which in ordinary life is
expressed by saying: "If it were true, we should have heard of it;" it
implies a general proposition which may be formulated thus: "If an
alleged event really had occurred, there would be some document in
existence in which it would be referred to."

In order that such reasoning should be justified it would be necessary
that every fact should have been observed and recorded in writing, and
that all the records should have been preserved. Now, the