two sides to
conduct a Civil or any other kind of War, and the British Army was
apparently not available, there was no fear of Civil War, and they (the
Unionist Party) could well afford to stiffen themselves about the lips.

And all this tended to embarrass the labours (if any) of those leaders
who were still supposed to be holding communion together for the
furtherance of a compromise.

Now, among the Ulster Volunteers, though perfect sobriety was exhorted
and maintained, it was excusably felt that it would be a pity if so fine
a force should have been raised and armed at such expense and sacrifice
and then have no chance of showing what it could do. And this feeling
evoked sympathy in the breasts of the Irish of the South and West; and
they said to them of Ulster, "Rather than see your army wasted we will
ourselves raise one for you to shoot at." And this they did, in part for
sheer joy of the chance of a fight, and in part for admiration of the
sportsmanship of a people that had defied a British Government. And
though some joined the new Volunteers for love of Home Rule, and with
the object of offering themselves as substitutes for the British Army,
yet the promoters were content to allege, vaguely and inoffensively,
that their object was just the protection of Irish liberty, whatever
that might be taken to mean. And, being Irish, no exact logic was asked
of them.

But at first Mr. REDMOND, as a supporter of the law, and scandalised by
its breach in Ulster, declined to approve this illegal development,
which for the rest he regarded as negligible. But later, when it had
grown too large to be ignored, he generously consented to overlook its
illegality and to place it under official patronage. But his offer was
received in a spirit of very regrettable independence. On reflection,
however, this attitude was exchanged for one of sullen submission.

Now a private army is a dangerous thing when you know what it is for;
but it is a very dangerous thing when you don't. And there were
cynics--not too frivolous--who held that the best course for the
Government would be to withdraw from Ireland for the time being and
leave Ulster and the Rest to come to an agreement of their own, either
with or without a bloody prelude. And there were other critics--not much
more frivolous--who replied that, if we walked out of Ireland and left
Ulster and the Rest to come to terms, they might get to understand one
another to such good purp