t an
officer at Gyantse, and none at Lhasa, will be interpreted by the
Tibetans as a sign of weakness.

Then, again, diplomatic relations with Tibet can only continue a farce
while we are ignorant of the political situation in Lhasa. Influences in
the capital grow and decay with remarkable rapidity. The Lamas are
adepts in intrigue. When we left Lhasa, the best-informed of our
political officers could not hazard a guess as to what party would be in
power in a month's time, whether the Dalai Lama would come back, or in
what manner his deposition would affect our future relations with the
country. We only knew that our departure from Lhasa was likely to be the
signal for a conflict of political factions that would involve a state
of confusion. The Dalai Lama still commanded the loyalty of a large body
of monks. Sera Monastery was known to support him, while Gaden, though
it contained a party who favoured the deposed Shata Shape, numbered many
adherents to his cause. The only political figure who had no following
or influence of any kind was the unfortunate Amban.[24] Whatever party
gains the upper hand, the position of the Chinese Amban is not enviable.

[24] The Amban or Chinese Resident in Lhasa is in the same position
as a British Resident in the Court of a protected chief in India.
Of late years, however, the Amban's authority has been little
more than nominal.

At the moment of writing China has not signed the treaty; she may do so
yet, but her signature is not of vital importance. The Tibetans will
decide for themselves whether it is safe to provoke our hostility. If
they decide to defy us, then of course trouble may arise from their
refusing to recognise the treaty of 1904 on the pretext that it was not
signed by the Amban.

It will be remembered that after the campaign of 1888 the convention we
drew up in Calcutta was signed by China, and afterwards repudiated by
Tibet. For many years the Tibetans have ignored China's suzerainty, and
refused to be bound by a convention drawn up by her in their behalf; but
now the plea of suzerainty is convenient, they may use it as a pretext
to escape their new obligations.

It is even possible that the Amban advised the Tibetan delegates in
Lhasa to agree to any terms we asked, if they wanted to be rid of us, as
any treaty we might make with them would be invalid without the
acquiescence of China. Thus the 'vicious circle' revolves, and a more
admirable