is matter is the same as that of the democratic
countries of Europe, and of the other European colonies. It is not, or
at least one may believe it is not yet, that in the patriotic
apprehension of the common man, or of the administration which speaks
for him, the resources of the country would be inadequate to meet any
contingencies of the kind that might arise, whether in respect of
industrial capacity or in point of man-power, if these resources were
turned to this object with the same singleness of purpose and the same
drastic procedure that marks the course of a national establishment
guided by no considerations short of imperial dominion. The doubt
presents itself rather as an apprehension that the cost would be
extravagantly high, in all respects in which cost can be counted; which
is presently seconded, on very slight reflection and review of
experience, by recognition of the fact that a democracy is, in point of
fact, not to be persuaded to stand under arms interminably in mere
readiness for a contingency, however distasteful the contingency may be.

In point of fact, a democratic commonwealth is moved by other interests
in the main, and the common defense is a secondary consideration, not a
primary interest,--unless in the exceptional case of a commonwealth so
placed under the immediate threat of invasion as to have the common
defense forced into the place of paramount consequence in its workday
habits of thought. The American republic is not so placed. Anyone may
satisfy himself by reasonable second thought that the people of this
nation are not to be counted on to do their utmost in time of peace to
prepare for war. They may be persuaded to do much more than has been
their habit, and adventurous politicians may commit them to much more
than the people at large would wish to undertake, but when all is done
that can be counted on for a permanency, up to the limit of popular
tolerance, it would be a bold guess that should place the result at more
than one-half of what the country is capable of. Particularly would the
people's patience balk at the extensive military training requisite to
put the country in an adequate position of defense against a sudden and
well-prepared offensive. It is otherwise with a dynastic State, to the
directorate of which all other interests are necessarily secondary,
subsidiary, and mainly to be considered only in so far as they are
contributory to the nation's readiness for warlike ent