he former survives the close of
that correlation as for supposing that the latter does. True, we
perceive the material remaining and do not perceive the spirit.
Yes; but the differentiation of the two is exactly this, that one
is appreciable by the senses, while the other transcends and
baffles them. It is absolutely inconceivable in imagination,
wholly incredible to reason, intrinsically nonsensical every way,
that a shifting concourse of atoms, a plastic arrangement of
particles, a regular succession of galvanic shocks, a continuous
series of nervous currents, or any thing of the sort, should
constitute the reality of a human soul, the process of a human
life, the accumulated treasures of a human experience, all
preserved at command and traversed by the moral lines of personal
identity. The things lie in different spheres and are full of
incommunicable contrasts. However numerously and intimately
correlated the physical and psychical constituents of man are,
yet, so far as we can know any thing about them, they are steeply
opposed to each other both in essence and function. Otherwise
consciousness is mendacious and language is unmeaning. A recent
able author speaks of "that congeries of organs whose union forms
the brain and whose action constitutes the mind." 10 The mind,
then, is an action! Can an action love and hate, choose and
resolve, rejoice and grieve, remember, repent, and pray? Is not an
agent necessary for an action? All such speculative conceptions as
to the nature of soul as make it purely phenomenal are to be
offset, if they can be, by the view which exhibits the personal
ego or conscious selfhood of the soul, not as an empty spot in
which a swarm of relations centre as their goal point, but as an
indestructible monad, the innermost and substantial essence and
cause of the organization, the self apprehending and unchangeable
axis of all thinking and acting. Some of the most free, acute,
learned, wise, and powerful thinkers of the world have been
champions of this doctrine; especially among the moderns may be
named Leibnitz, Herbart, Goethe, and Hartenstein. Jacobi most
earnestly maintained it both against Mendelssohn and against
Fichte.

10 Bucknill and Tuke, Psychological Medicine, p. 371.

That the mind is a substantial entity, and therefore may be
conceived as immortal, that it is not a mere functional operation
accompanying the organic life, a phantom procession of conscious
states filing off