lls, and at length to offer us that
battle which was so ardently desired. The moment that was to decide the
fate of Russia had at last arrived.

The emperor immediately went through the whole line, and allotted to
each his place. Davoust, and next to him Count Lobau, were to deploy on
the right of Ney: the guard in the centre, as a reserve, and farther
off the army of Italy. The place of Junot and the Westphalians was
indicated; but a false movement had carried them out of the way. Murat
and Poniatowski formed the right of the army; those two chiefs already
threatened the city: he made them draw back to the margin of a coppice,
and leave vacant before them a spacious plain, extending from this wood
as far as the Dnieper. It was a field of battle which he offered to the
enemy. The French army, thus posted, had defiles and precipices at its
back; but Napoleon concerned himself little about retreat; he thought
only of victory.

Bagration and Barclay were meanwhile returning at full speed towards
Smolensk; the first to save it by a battle, the other to cover the
flight of its inhabitants and the evacuation of its magazines: he was
determined to leave us nothing but its ashes. The two Russian generals
arrived panting on the heights on the right bank; nor did they again
take breath till they saw that they were still masters of the bridges
which connect the two towns.

Napoleon then caused the enemy to be harassed by a host of riflemen, for
the purpose of drawing him to the left bank of the river, and ensuring a
battle for the following day. It is asserted that Bagration would have
fallen in with his views, but that Barclay did not expose him to the
temptation. He despatched him to Elnia, and took upon himself the
defence of Smolensk.

Barclay had imagined that the greatest part of our army was marching
upon Elnia, to get between Moscow and the Russian army. He deceived
himself by the disposition, so common in war, of imputing to one's enemy
designs contrary to those which he demonstrates. For the defensive,
being uneasy in its nature, frequently magnifies the offensive, and
fear, heating the imagination, causes it to attribute to the enemy a
thousand projects of which he never dreamt. It is possible too that
Barclay, having to cope with a colossal foe, felt authorized to expect
from him gigantic movements.

The Russians themselves have since reproached Napoleon with not having
adopted that manoeuvre; but have they consi