s had crept into the
system of government, and in extensive preparations for his intended
conquest in Gaul. Besides the troops which he collected from his
province, he obtained from Africa a large body of chosen Berber cavalry,
officered by Arabs of proved skill and valor; and in the summer of 732
he crossed the Pyrenees at the head of an army which some Arab writers
rate at eighty thousand strong, while some of the Christian chroniclers
swell its numbers to many hundreds of thousands more. Probably the Arab
account diminishes, but of the two keeps nearer to the truth.

It was from this formidable host, after Eudes, the count of Aquitaine,
had vainly striven to check it, after many strong cities had fallen
before it, and half the land had been overrun, that Gaul and Christendom
were at last rescued by the strong arm of Prince Charles, who acquired a
surname (_Martel_, the "Hammer") like that of the war-god of his
forefathers' creed, from the might with which he broke and shattered his
enemies in the battle.

The Merovingian kings had sunk into absolute insignificance, and had
become mere puppets of royalty before the eighth century. Charles
Martel, like his father, Pepin Heristal, was duke of the Austrasian
Franks, the bravest and most thoroughly Germanic part of the nation, and
exercised, in the name of the titular king, what little paramount
authority the turbulent minor rulers of districts and towns could be
persuaded or compelled to acknowledge. Engaged with his national
competitors in perpetual conflicts for power, and in more serious
struggles for safety against the fierce tribes of the unconverted
Frisians, Bavarians, Saxons, and Thuringians, who at that epoch assailed
with peculiar ferocity the Christianized Germans on the left bank of the
Rhine, Charles Martel added experienced skill to his natural courage,
and he had also formed a militia of veterans among the Franks.

Hallam has thrown out a doubt whether, in our admiration of his victory
at Tours, we do not judge a little too much by the event, and whether
there was not rashness in his risking the fate of France on the result
of a general battle with the invaders. But when we remember that Charles
had no standing army, and the independent spirit of the Frank warriors
who followed his standard, it seems most probable that it was not in his
power to adopt the cautious policy of watching the invaders, and wearing
out their strength by delay. So dreadful and s