ultiplied, and the ready expedient was adopted of delegating the
jurisdiction of the people to the ordinary magistrates or to
extraordinary inquisitors. In the first ages these questions were rare
and occasional. In the beginning of the seventh century of Rome they
were made perpetual: four praetors were annually empowered to sit in
judgment on the state offences of treason, extortion, peculation, and
bribery; and Sylla added new praetors and new questions for those crimes
which more directly injure the safety of individuals. By these
inquisitors the trial was prepared and directed; but they could only
pronounce the sentence of the majority of judges. To discharge this
important though burdensome office, an annual list of ancient and
respectable citizens was formed by the praetor. After many constitutional
struggles they were chosen in equal numbers from the senate, the
equestrian order, and the people; four hundred and fifty were appointed
for single questions, and the various rolls or _decuries_ of judges must
have contained the names of some thousand Romans who represented the
judicial authority of the State. In each particular cause a sufficient
number was drawn from the urn; their integrity was guarded by an oath;
the mode of ballot secured their independence; the suspicion of
partiality was removed by the mutual challenges of the accuser and
defendant; and the judges of Milo, by the retrenchment of fifteen on
each side, were reduced to fifty-one voices or tablets of acquittal, of
condemnation, or of favorable doubt.[39]

3. In his civil jurisdiction the praetor of the city was truly a judge,
and almost a legislator; but as soon as he had prescribed the action of
law he often referred to a delegate the determination of the fact. With
the increase of legal proceedings, the tribunal of the centumvirs in
which he presided acquired more weight and reputation. But whether he
acted alone, or with the advice of his council, the most absolute powers
might be trusted to a magistrate who was annually chosen by the votes of
the people. The rules and precautions of freedom have required some
explanation; the order of despotism is simple and inanimate. Before the
age of Justinian, or perhaps of Diocletian, the decuries of Roman judges
had sunk to an empty title: the humble advice of the assessors might be
accepted or despised, and in each tribunal the civil and criminal
jurisdiction was administered by a single magistrate, who w