eutenant-General Grant in the Field, Halleck being assigned to "duty,
in Washington, as Chief-of-staff of the Army, under the direction of the
Secretary of War and the Lieutenant-General commanding."

By the same order, Sherman was assigned to the command of the "Military
Division of the Mississippi," composed of the Departments of the Ohio,
the Cumberland, the Tennessee, and the Arkansas; and McPherson to that
of the Department and Army of the Tennessee.

On the 23rd of March, Grant was back again at Washington, and at once
proceeded to Culpepper Court-house, Virginia, where his Headquarters in
the field were, for a time, to be.

Here he completed his plans, and reorganized his Forces, for the coming
conflicts, in the South-west and South-east, which were to result in a
full triumph to the Union Arms, and Peace to a preserved Union.

It is evident, from the utterances of Mr. Lincoln when Vicksburg fell,
that he had then become pretty well satisfied that Grant was "the coming
man," to whom it would be safe to confide the management and chief
leadership of our Armies. Chattanooga merely confirmed that belief--as
indeed it did that of Union men generally. But the concurrent judgment
of Congress and the President had now, as we have seen, placed Grant in
that chief command; and the consequent relief to Mr. Lincoln, in thus
having the heavy responsibility of Army-control, long unwillingly
exercised by him, taken from his own shoulders and placed upon those of
the one great soldier in whom he had learned to have implicit faith,--a
faith earned by steady and unvaryingly successful achievements in the
Field--must have been most grateful.

Other responsibilities would still press heavily enough upon the
President's time and attention. Questions touching the Military and
Civil government of regions of the Enemy's country, conquered by the
Union arms; of the rehabilitation or reconstruction of the Rebel States;
of a thousand and one other matters, of greater or lesser perplexity,
growing out of these and other questions; besides the ever pressing and
gigantic problems involved in the raising of enormous levies of troops,
and prodigious sums of money, needed in securing, moving, and supplying
them, and defraying the extraordinary expenses growing out of the
necessary blockade of thousands of miles of Southern Coast, and other
Naval movements; not to speak of those expenditures belonging to the
more ordinary business transac