Thomas's reply was:

NASHVILLE, October 17, 1864--10.30 a.m.

Major-General SHERMAN:

Your dispatch from Ship's Gap, 5 p.m. of the 16th, just received.
Schofield, whom I placed in command of the two divisions (Wagner's
and Morgan's), was to move up Lookout Valley this A.M., to
intercept Hood, should he be marching for Bridgeport. I will order
him to join you with the two divisions, and will reconstruct the
road as soon as possible. Will also reorganize the guards for
posts and block-houses .... Mower and Wilson have arrived, and are
on their way to join you. I hope you will adopt Grant's idea of
turning Wilson loose, rather than undertake the plan of a march
with the whole force through Georgia to the sea, inasmuch as
General Grant cannot cooperate with you as at first arranged.

GEORGE H. THOMAS, Major-General.

So it is clear that at that date neither General Grant nor General
Thomas heartily favored my proposed plan of campaign. On the same
day, I wrote to General Schofield at Chattanooga:

Hood is not at Dear Head Cove. We occupy Ship's Gap and Lafayette.
Hood is moving south via Summerville, Alpine, and Gadsden. If he
enters Tennessee, it will be to the west of Huntsville, but I think
he has given up all such idea. I want the road repaired to
Atlanta; the sick and wounded men sent north of the Tennessee; my
army recomposed; and I will then make the interior of Georgia feel
the weight of war. It is folly for us to be moving our armies on
the reports of scouts and citizens. We must maintain the
offensive. Your first move on Trenton and Valley Head was right
--the move to defend Caperton's Ferry is wrong. Notify General
Thomas of these my views. We must follow Hood till he is beyond
the reach of mischief, and then resume the offensive.

The correspondence between me and the authorities at Washington, as
well as with the several army commanders, given at length in the
report of the Committee on the Conduct of the War, is full on all
these points.

After striking our road at Dalton, Hood was compelled to go on to
Chattanooga and Bridgeport, or to pass around by Decatur and
abandon altogether his attempt to make us let go our hold of
Atlanta by attacking our communications. It was clear to me that
he had no intention to meet us in open battle, and the lightness
and celerity of his army convinced me that I could not possibly
catch him on a stern-chase. We therefore quietly followed him down