the most of our aerial chances, and so
forestall betrayal by war-weariness, civilian pacifism, self-centred
fools, and strange people.

From an army point of view the probable outcome of an extensive aerial
offensive would be still greater. Well-organised bomb raids on German
aerodromes during the night and early morning have several times kept
the sky clear of hostile aircraft during the day of an important
advance. If this be achieved with our present limited number of bombing
machines, much more will be possible when we have double or treble the
supply. Imagine the condition of a particular sector of the advanced
lines of communication if it were bombed every day by scores of
aeroplanes. Scarcely any movement would be possible until bad weather
made the attacks non-continuous; and few supply depots in the chosen
area would afterwards remain serviceable. Infantry and artillery
dependent upon this district of approach from the rear would thus be
deprived of essential supplies.

Apart from extensive bombing, an air offensive of at least equal value
may happen in the form of machine-gun attacks from above. To-day
nothing seems to panic the Boche more than a sudden swoop by a
low-flying aeroplane, generous of bullets, as those of us who have tried
this game have noticed. No German trench, no emplacement, no battery
position, no line of transport is safe from the R.F.C. Vickers and Lewis
guns; and retaliation is difficult because of the speed and erratic
movement of the attacking aeroplane. Little imagination is necessary to
realise the damage, moral and material, which could be inflicted on any
selected part of the front if it were constantly scoured by a few dozen
of such guerilla raiders. No movement could take place during the
daytime, and nobody could remain in the open for longer than a few
minutes.

The seemingly far-fetched speculations above are commonplace enough in
the judgment of aeronautical people of far greater authority and
experience than I can claim. But they could only be brought to
materialisation by an abnormal supply of modern aeroplanes, especially
the chaser craft necessary to keep German machines from interference.
Given the workshop effort to provide this supply, French and British
pilots can be relied upon to make the most of it. I am convinced that
war flying will be organised as a means to victory; but as my opinion is
of small expert value I do not propose to discuss how it might be done.