and uniformly selfish. A correct examination of facts will
lead us to discover that quality which is common to all virtuous
actions, and which distinguishes them from those which are vicious and
criminal. But we shall see that it is necessary for man to be governed
not by his own transient and hasty opinion upon the tendency of every
particular action, but by those fixed and unalterable rules, which are
the joint result of the impartial judgment, the natural feelings, and
the embodied experience of mankind. The authority of these rules is,
indeed, founded only on their tendency to promote private and public
welfare; but the morality of actions will appear solely to consist in
their correspondence with the rule. By the help of this obvious
distinction we shall vindicate a just theory, which, far from being
modern, is, in fact, as ancient as philosophy, both from plausible
objections, and from the odious imputation of supporting those absurd
and monstrous systems which have been built upon it. Beneficial tendency
is the foundation of rules, and the criterion by which habits and
sentiments are to be tried. But it is neither the immediate standard,
nor can it ever be the principal motive of action. An action, to be
completely virtuous, must accord with moral rules, and must flow from
our natural feelings and affections, moderated, matured, and improved
into steady habits of right conduct.[16] Without, however, dwelling
longer on subjects which cannot be clearly stated, unless they are fully
unfolded, I content myself with observing, that it shall be my object,
in this preliminary, but most important part of the course, to lay the
foundations of morality so deeply in human nature, as may satisfy the
coldest inquirer; and, at the same time, to vindicate the paramount
authority of the rules of our duty, at all times, and in all places,
over all opinions of interest and speculations of benefit, so
extensively, so universally, and so inviolably, as may well justify the
grandest and the most apparently extravagant effusions of moral
enthusiasm. If, notwithstanding all my endeavours to deliver these
doctrines with the utmost simplicity, any of my auditors should still
reproach me for introducing such abstruse matters, I must shelter myself
behind the authority of the wisest of men. "If they (the ancient
moralists), before they had come to the popular and received notions of
virtue and vice, had staid a little longer upon the inquiry