ion of the principle. If we justify property on the ground that
it is fair that a man should keep what he has earned by his own labour,
it seems to follow that it is unjust that he should have anything not
earned by his labour. In other words, the answer admits the ordinary
first principle from which Socialism starts, and which, in some
Socialist theories, it definitely tries to embody.

All that I have tried to do, so far, is to show that the bare doctrine
of equality, which is in some way connected with the demand for
justice, is not, of necessity, either unjust or impracticable. It
may be used to cover claims which are unjust, to sanction bare
confiscation, to take away motives for industry, and, briefly, may be a
demand of the drones to have an equal share of the honey. From the bare
abstract principle of equality between men, we can, in my own opinion,
deduce nothing; and, I do not think that the principle can itself be
established. That is why it is made a first principle, or, in other
words, one which is not to be discussed. The French revolutionists
treated it in this way as _a priori_ and self-evident. No school was in
more deadly opposition to such _a priori_ truths than the school of
Bentham and the utilitarians. Yet, Bentham's famous doctrine, that in
calculating happiness each man is to count for one, and nobody for more
than one, seems to be simply the old principle in a new disguise. James
Mill applied the doctrine to politics. J. S. Mill again applied it,
with still more thoroughness, especially in his doctrine of
representation and of the equality of the sexes. Accordingly, various
moralists have urged that this was an inconsistency in utilitarian
doctrine, implying that they, too, could make _a priori_ first
principles when they wanted them. It has become a sort of orthodox
dogma with radicals, who do not always trouble themselves about a
philosophical basis, and is applied with undoubting confidence to many
practical political problems. "One man, one vote" is not simply the
formulation of a demand, but seems to intimate a logical ground for the
demand. If, in politics, one man is rightfully entitled to one vote, is
it not also true that, in economics, one man should have a right to one
income, or, that money, like political power, should be distributed
into precisely equal shares? Yet, why are we to take for granted the
equality of men in the sense required for such deductions? Since men
are not equal