every fresh observation of
the workings of our own hearts, will gradually concur to perfect us. Let
it not, after all then, be our reproach, and at length our ruin, that
these abundant means of instruction are possessed in vain.

SECTION III.

_Corruption of Human Nature.--Objection._

But there is one difficulty still behind, more formidable than all the
rest. The pride of man is loth to be humbled. Forced to abandon the plea
of innocence, and pressed so closely that he can no longer escape from
the conclusion to which we would drive him, some more bold objector
faces about and stands at bay, endeavouring to justify what he cannot
deny, "Whatever I am," he contends, "I am what my Creator made me. I
inherited a nature, you yourself confess, depraved, and prone to evil:
how then can I withstand the temptations to sin by which I am environed?
If this plea cannot establish my innocence, it must excuse or at least
extenuate my guilt. Frail and weak as I am, a Being of infinite justice
and goodness will never try me by a rule, which however equitable in the
case of creatures of a higher nature, is altogether disproportionate to
mine."

Let not my readers be alarmed! The writer is not going to enter into the
discussion of the grand question concerning the origin of moral evil,
or to attempt at large to reconcile its existence and consequent
punishment with the acknowledged attributes and perfections of God.
These are questions, of which, if one may judge from the little success
with which the acutest and profoundest reasoners have been ever
labouring to solve the difficulties they contain, the full and clear
comprehension is above the intellect of man. Yet, as such an objection
as that which has been stated is sometimes heard from the mouths of
professed Christians, it must not be passed by without a few short
observations.

Were the language in question to be addressed to us by an avowed
sceptic, though it might not be very difficult to expose to him the
futility of _his_ reasonings, we should almost despair of satisfying him
of the soundness of our own. We should perhaps suggest impossibilities,
which might stand in the way of such a system as he would establish: we
might indeed point out wherein (arguing from concessions which he would
freely make) his pre-conceptions concerning the conduct of the Supreme
Being, had been in fact already contradicted, particularly by the
existence at all of natural or moral evil: an