t return, and without utility. But will not that we shall
have spilt of the enemy fall on our own heads? Will they not make us
expiate our mad and cruel resistance by a disgraceful capitulation? If
the allies, at the present moment, think themselves strong enough to
refuse you a suspension of hostilities, what will they do, when they
have their twelve hundred thousand soldiers on our territory? The
dismemberment of France, the pillage and devastation of the capital,
will be, perhaps, the fruit of the rash defence you propose to us."
These considerations, the force of which was generally felt, were
unanimously approved. It was acknowledged, that it would be
unquestionably most prudent, not to expose the capital to the
consequences and dangers of a siege, or of being taken by assault. It
was acknowledged, too, at least by implication, that, the return of
the Bourbons being inevitable, it was better to recall them
voluntarily, under good conditions, than to leave to the allies the
act of restoring them. But the members did not think proper, to
explain themselves on this delicate subject; and accordingly confined
themselves to laconic answers of the questions proposed by the
committee.
_Questions proposed by the Committee of Government to the Council of
War, assembled at la Villette, July the 1st, 1815._
"1st. What is the state of the intrenchments raised for the defence of
Paris?--_Answer._ The state of the intrenchments, and their supply of
ordnance, on the right bank of the Seine, though incomplete, is in
general satisfactory enough. On the left bank the intrenchments may be
considered as null.
"2d. The army, can it cover and defend Paris?--_Ans._ It may: but not
indefinitely. It ought not to expose itself to a want of provision, or
to have its retreat cut off.
"3d. If the army were attacked on all points, could it prevent the
enemy from penetrating into Paris on one side or the other?--_Ans._ It
would be difficult for the army to be attacked on all points at once:
but should this happen, there would be little hope of resistance.
"4th. In case of a defeat, could the commander in chief reserve, or
collect, sufficient means, to oppose a forcible entry?--_Ans._ No
general can answer for the consequences of a battle.
"5th. Is there sufficient ammunition for several battles?--_Ans._ Yes.
"6th. In fine, can you answer for the fate of the capital? and for how
long a time?--_Ans._ We can warrant nothing on thi
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