history, its
primitive forms, its stage of tentativeness and error: it _becomes_ a
conviction only after having been, for a long time, _not_ one, and then,
for an even longer time, _hardly_ one. What if falsehood be also one of
these embryonic forms of conviction?--Sometimes all that is needed is a
change in persons: what was a lie in the father becomes a conviction in
the son.--I call it lying to refuse to see what one sees, or to refuse
to see it _as_ it is: whether the lie be uttered before witnesses or not
before witnesses is of no consequence. The most common sort of lie is
that by which a man deceives himself: the deception of others is a
relatively rare offence.--Now, this will _not_ to see what one sees,
this will _not_ to see it as it is, is almost the first requisite for
all who belong to a party of whatever sort: the party man becomes
inevitably a liar. For example, the German historians are convinced that
Rome was synonymous with despotism and that the Germanic peoples brought
the spirit of liberty into the world: what is the difference between
this conviction and a lie? Is it to be wondered at that all partisans,
including the German historians, instinctively roll the fine phrases of
morality upon their tongues--that morality almost owes its very
_survival_ to the fact that the party man of every sort has need of it
every moment?--"This is _our_ conviction: we publish it to the whole
world; we live and die for it--let us respect all who have
convictions!"--I have actually heard such sentiments from the mouths of
anti-Semites. On the contrary, gentlemen! An anti-Semite surely does not
become more respectable because he lies on principle.... The priests,
who have more finesse in such matters, and who well understand the
objection that lies against the notion of a conviction, which is to say,
of a falsehood that becomes a matter of principle _because_ it serves a
purpose, have borrowed from the Jews the shrewd device of sneaking in
the concepts, "God," "the will of God" and "the revelation of God" at
this place. Kant, too, with his categorical imperative, was on the same
road: this was his _practical_ reason.[28] There are questions regarding
the truth or untruth of which it is _not_ for man to decide; all the
capital questions, all the capital problems of valuation, are beyond
human reason.... To know the limits of reason--_that_ alone is genuine
philosophy.... Why did God make a revelation to man? Would God h