them, the other, that they only depend upon the inconstancie of
chance, and the whisling toyishness of custome, it might be thought no
matter of extraordinary concernment, if one pretended to succeed in a study
of this nature by the single efforts of the memory, without either the
vivacitie of imagination, or the force of reason being interress'd.

But being not very well perswaded of the agreeableness of this method, in
direct opposition to it, I have fastn'd the whole designe in hand upon
these two propositions:

First, that _there is a certain accord between the Severall Languages:_ and
that therefore they are attainable by comparison.

Secondly, _they are unquestionably founded upon reason_, and therefore that
must be made use of in their mutuall reference. It is upon these two
foundations that I pretend to establish the true method of gaining a
mastery of the Languages, making it appear to the world by a sensible
experience that the mind can as easily make reflections upon words, as upon
the things they represent: _Imagination_ and _Reason_ being the two
faculties, that can reflect upon their objects, they both will appear in
the present designe in their uses suitable to their nature, the effects of
_Imagination_ shall be visible in the severall resemblances, and the
inferences that are thence made; and it will be the worke of _Reason_ to
reduce all to certain principles, upon which the argumentative part must
relye.

_The first part of the Designe._

For the easier exercise of Imagination, I shall acquaint you with a method
that will appeare very naturall, by which insteed of considering the
Languages precisely in themselves (as hitherto hath been usuall) they may
be compar'd one with the other without much difficultie, and at the same
time their accord, dependance, and mutuall relation, discover'd either from
the resemblance of words, the proportion of their scope or compasse, and
the conformity of their expressions. Tis true that this agreement, and
relation is not a little obscur'd by the severall od constitutions of mens
minds, that checque at, and satisfie themselves with the first, and naked
appearance without any farther inquirie, but withall its presently, and
easily perceiv'd by those who are happy enough, in a genius for such kind
of Learning. Its something like the paradoxes Geometry proposeth upon the
relation, and proportion of figures, where we are mus'd at the first
draught, and there appeares s