he story as told in an earlier work (_Cuba, and
the Intervention_). On the 10th of October, 1868, Carlos Manuel Cespedes
and his associates raised the cry of Cuban independence at Yara, in the
Province of Puerto Principe (now Camaguey). On the 10th of April, 1869,
there was proclaimed the Constitution of the Cuban Republic. During the
intervening months, there was considerable fighting, though it was largely
in the nature of guerrilla skirmishing. The Spanish Minister of State
asserted in a memorandum issued to Spain's representatives in other
countries, under date of February 3, 1876, that at the outbreak of the
insurrection Spain had 7,500 troops, all told, in Cuba. According to
General Sickels, at that time the American Minister to Spain, this number
was increased by reinforcements of 34,500 within the first year of the war.
The accuracy of this information, however, has been questioned. Prior
to the establishment of the so-called Republic, the affairs of the
insurrection were in the hands of an Assembly of Representatives. On
February 26, this body issued a decree proclaiming the abolition of slavery
throughout the island, and calling upon those who thus received their
freedom to "contribute their efforts to the independence of Cuba." During
the opening days of April, 1869, the Assembly met at Guiamaro. On the tenth
of that month a government was organized, with a president, vice-president,
general-in-chief of the army, secretaries of departments, and a parliament
or congress. Carlos Manuel Cespedes was chosen as President, and Manuel
de Quesada as General-in-Chief. A Constitution was adopted. Senor Morales
Lemus was appointed as minister to the United States, to represent the new
Republic, and to ask official recognition by the American Government. The
government which the United States was asked to recognize was a somewhat
vague institution. The insurrection, or revolution, if it may be so
called, at this time consisted of a nominal central government, chiefly
self-organized and self-elected, and various roving bands, probably
numbering some thousands in their aggregate, of men rudely and
incompetently armed, and showing little or nothing of military organization
or method.

Like all Cuban-Spanish wars and warfare, the destruction of property was a
common procedure. Some of the methods employed for the suppression of the
insurrection were not unlike those adopted by General Weyler in the later
war. At Bayamo, on Ap