of which my darling had always been the sunshine and the
music, weighed on me like an evil dream: at night I could not sleep,
missing in the darkness the soft breathing of the little child; her cries
as she clung to me and was forcibly carried away rang ever in my ears; at
last, on July 25th, I was suddenly struck down with fever, and had the
rest of pain and delirium instead of the agony of conscious loss. While I
was lying there prostrate an order was served on me from the Master of
the Rolls, granted on Mr. Besant's application, to restrain me from
bringing any suit against him. As soon as I recovered, I took steps for
contesting this order, but no definite action could be taken until after
the Long Vacation. The case came on for hearing first in November, 1878,
and then in January, 1879. All access to the children had been denied me,
and the money due to me had been withheld. By this my opponent had put
himself so completely in the wrong that even the Master of the Rolls
uttered words of severe condemnation of the way in which I had been
treated. Then a curious interlude took place. The Master of the Rolls
advised me to file a counter-claim for divorce or for judicial
separation, and I gladly agreed to do so, feeling very doubtful as to the
Master of the Rolls' power to do anything of the kind, but very glad that
he should think he had the authority. While the claim was being prepared,
I obtained access to the children under an interim order, as well as the
money owing to me, and at the end of March the case again came before the
Master of the Rolls. The claim filed alleged distinct acts of cruelty,
and I brought witnesses to support the claim, among them the doctor who
had attended me during my married life. Mr. Ince filed an answer of
general denial, adding that the acts of cruelty, if any, were "done in
the heat of the moment". He did not, however, venture to contest the
case, although I tendered myself for cross-examination, but pleaded the
deed of separation as a bar to further proceedings on my part; I argued
on the other hand that as the deed had been broken by the plaintiff's
act, all my original rights revived. Sir George Jessel held that the deed
of separation condoned all that had gone before it, if it was raised as a
bar to further proceedings, and expressed his regret that he had not
known there would be "any objection on the other side", when he advised a
claim for a judicial separation. On the final hea