genius and taste are strictly reducible to rules, and that there is a
rule for everything. So far is it from being true that the finest breath
of fancy is a definable thing, that the plainest common sense is only
what Mr. Locke would have called a _mixed mode_, subject to a particular
sort of acquired and undefinable tact. It is asked, "If you do not know
the rule by which a thing is done, how can you be sure of doing it a
second time?" And the answer is, "If you do not know the muscles by the
help of which you walk, how is it you do not fall down at every step you
take?" In art, in taste, in life, in speech, you decide from feeling,
and not from reason; that is, from the impression of a number of things
on the mind, from which impression is true and well founded, though you
may not be able to analyse or account for it in the several particulars.
In a gesture you use, in a look you see, in a tone you hear, you judge
of the expression, propriety, and meaning from habit, not from reason
or rules; that is to say, from innumerable instances of like gestures,
looks, and tones, in innumerable other circumstances, variously
modified, which are too many and too refined to be all distinctly
recollected, but which do not therefore operate the less powerfully
upon the mind and eye of taste. Shall we say that these impressions (the
immediate stamp of nature) do not operate in a given manner till they
are classified and reduced to rules, or is not the rule itself grounded,
upon the truth and certainty of that natural operation?

How then can the distinction of the understanding as to the manner in
which they operate be necessary to their producing their due and uniform
effect upon the mind? If certain effects did not regularly arise out of
certain causes in mind as well as matter, there could be no rule given
for them: nature does not follow the rule, but suggests it. Reason is
the interpreter and critic of nature and genius, not their law-giver and
judge. He must be a poor creature indeed whose practical convictions do
not in almost all cases outrun his deliberate understanding, or who does
not feel and know much more than he can give a reason for. Hence the
distinction between eloquence and wisdom, between ingenuity and common
sense. A man may be dexterous and able in explaining the grounds of his
opinions, and yet may be a mere sophist, because he only sees one-half
of a subject. Another may feel the whole weight of a question, n