sence, although
we were close upon them, they moved off in the morning toward
Cincinnati. Moving at 5 A.M., we reached Harrison by one o'clock of the
13th. Here General Morgan began to maneuver for the benefit of the
commanding officer, at Cincinnati. He took it for granted (for it was
utterly impossible moving as rapidly as we were forced to do, and in the
midst of a strange and hostile population, to get positive information
regarding any matter), that there was a strong force of regular troops
in Cincinnati. Burnside had them not far off, and General Morgan
supposed that they would, of course, be brought there. If we could get
past Cincinnati safely, the danger of the expedition, he thought, would
be more than half over. Here he expected to be confronted by the
concentrated forces of Judah and Burnside, and he anticipated great
difficulty in eluding or cutting his way through them. Once safely
through this peril, his escape would be certain, unless the river
remained so high that the transports could carry troops to intercept him
at the upper crossings. The cavalry following in his rear could not
overtake him as long as he kept in motion, and the infantry could not be
transported so rapidly by rail to the eastern part of the State that it
could be concentrated in sufficient strength to stop him. His object,
therefore, entertaining these views and believing that the great effort
to capture him would be made as he crossed the Hamilton and Dayton
railroad, was to deceive the enemy as to the exact point where he would
cross this road, and denude that point as much as possible of troops. He
sent detachments in various directions, seeking, however, to create the
impression that he was marching to Hamilton.

After two or three hours' halt at Harrison, the division moved directly
toward Cincinnati, the detachment coming in in the course of that
afternoon. Hoping that his previous demonstrations would induce the
sending of the bulk of the troops up the road, and that if any were left
at Cincinnati his subsequent threatening movements would cause them to
draw into the city, remain on the defensive, and permit him to pass
around it without attacking him, he sought to approach the city as
nearly as possible without actually entering it and involving his
command in a fight with any garrison which might be there. He has been
sometimes accused of a lack of enterprise in not capturing Cincinnati.
It must be remembered that Cincinnat