system of their own, and for many months
there was no alarm whatever,--the people raising their cotton and
supporting themselves. This went on, until, by a fatal error of
judgment, the men were all conscripted into the army. This was soon
discovered by the Rebels, who presently began to make raids upon the
island, so that ultimately the whole population had to be withdrawn.

Extend such settlements indefinitely, and we have the system adopted by
General Sherman. It is a system which, like every other practicable
method, must depend on military authority at last, and for which the
army should therefore be directly responsible. The main argument for
intrusting the care of the freedmen to a bureau of the War Department
is, that it must come to be controlled by that Department, at any rate,
and that it is best to have the responsibility rest where the power
lies. On conquered territory there can be but one authority, and no
conceivable ingenuity can construct any other system. If authority is
apparently divided, then either the military commander does not
understand his business, or he is hampered by impracticable orders and
should ask to be relieved. This is what has paralyzed the action of
every military governor, a title which implies a perfectly anomalous
function, certain to lead to trouble. Almost all the great good effected
by General Saxton has been achieved in spite of that function, not by
means of it; and it was not until he was placed in military command of
the post of Beaufort that he was able, even in that limited region, to
establish any satisfactory authority. All else that he did was by
sufferance, and often he could not even obtain sufferance.

While the war lasts, martial law must last. After martial law ceases,
civil institutions, whatever they may then be, must resume control. It
is therefore essential that all the rights of the freedmen should be put
upon a sure basis during the contest; but, whatever method be adopted,
the real control must inevitably rest with the War Department. It cannot
be transferred to civilians; nor is there reason to suppose it desirable
for the freedmen that it should. Whatever be the disorder resulting from
military command, it has the advantage of being more definite and
intelligible than civil mismanagement; there is always some one who can
be held responsible, and the offender is far more easily brought to
account. On this point I speak from personal experience. In South