r Sympathy_, when Affliction becomes more
intense and severe? To be tender and pitiful in the least and lowest
Matters, and unregardful and cruel in important and everlasting
Concerns, is, with regard to the _Divine Being_, a moral
Impossibility; 'tis _beneath_ human Nature and Prudence, and the
Practice of a good Man; And yet these Doctrines teach this horrible
impiety concerning the great God himself.

To sum up this Argument: That Being who can make a sensible rational
Creature, on _Purpose_ for _Damnation_, instead of taking a
reasonable Care of it, which, from its Make and Dependance, it has a
Right to expect, as much as though a formal Promise were made, may,
with altogether as much (_nay more_) Justice, break its Promises of
eternal Life, _made_ to another Creature of the same Kind; its Claim
not being founded in Nature, but built on Promise. As the former
would be a more cruel and un-justifiable Proceeding than the latter,
he that is capable of doing the one, can have _no moral Perfections_
in his Nature sufficient to secure the _Elect_ against his doing the
other: and on this _wild_ and _boundless_ Principle of _Sovereignty_,
it is possible that, with regard to _Religion_, Things may be quite
_reversed_ hereafter; the _Elect_, as they are called, made _miserable_,
and the _Non-elect, happy_. I think we may challenge the whole World,
to shew on this mad Principle the contrary; and why, as well as any
thing else, such an Economy may not be resolved into _Sovereign
Pleasure_. If God to _Isaac_ conveyed such errant Falshoods, by the
Instrumentality of _Jacob's Mouth_, _Why not_ make the same _deceitful
Use_ of the _Bible_, or even of his own immediate Word, in regard to
the Elect? If God, as Mr. _Gill_ (I think) observes, has two Wills,
"One publick Will of Command, and another of Intention, which is
private;" Why, with regard to the _Elect_, may he not promise one thing,
and intend, nay resolve on another? One would think it impossible, for
any understanding Man to judge thus of his Creator, that it is possible
he should command one Thing under the _severest Penalties_, and at
the _same Time_ not only _will_ and _intend_, but irresistibly and
secretly work to accomplish just the contrary, and (what is amazing
beyond Belief) after all punish severely the Creatures concerned,
whom he actuates to bring his secret Purposes to pass: If there can
be such a thing as arbitrary Power and tyrannical Government, in the
very