slippery doubleness endures. Let us suppose the
present tense, that gods and men and angels and devils march all
abreast in this present instant, and the only real time and date in the
universe is now. And what _is_ this instant now? Whatever else, it is
_process_--becoming and departing; with what between? Simply division,
difference; the present has no breadth for if it had, that which we
seek would be the middle of that breadth. There is no precipitate, as
on a stationary platform, of the process of becoming, no residuum of
the process of departing, but between the two is a curtain, _the
apparition of difference_, which is all the world."

I am using my scissors somewhat at random on my author's paragraphs,
since one place is as good as another for entering a ring by, and the
expert reader will discern at once the authentic dialectic circling.
Other paragraphs show Mr. Blood as more Hegelian still, and thoroughly
idealistic:--

"Assume that knowing is distinguishing, and that distinction is of
difference; if one knows a difference, one knows it as of entities
which afford it, and which also he knows; and he must know the entities
and the difference apart,--one from the other. Knowing all this, he
should be able to answer the twin question, 'What is the difference
_between sameness and difference_?' It is a 'twin' question, because
the two terms are equal in the proposition, and each is full of the
other. . . .

"Sameness has 'all the difference in the world'--from difference; and
difference is an entity as difference--it being identically that. They
are alike and different at once, since either is the other when the
observer would contrast it with the other; so that the sameness and the
difference are 'subjective,' are the property of the observer: his is
the 'limit' in their unlimited field. . . .

"We are thus apprized that distinction involves and carries its own
identity; and that ultimate distinction--distinction in the last
analysis--is self-distinction, 'self-knowledge,' as we realize it
consciously every day. Knowledge is self-referred: to know is to know
that you know, and to be known as well.

"'Ah! but _both in the same time_?' inquires the logician. A
subject-object knowing itself as a seamless unit, while yet its two
items show a real distinction: this passes all understanding."

But the whole of idealism goes to the proof that the two sides _cannot_
succeed one another in a time-proces