thoine had had less than six weeks in which to see what he
could do with the ground, organize the lines of communication, and post
his batteries and infantry. But he had no idea of delaying the British
offensive, and on the appointed day he was ready. The line of attack for
the three armies was some 20 kilometers long, namely, from the
Ypres-Menin road to the confluence of the Yperlee and Martje-Vaert, the
French holding the section between Drie Grachten and Boesinghe. It had
been settled that the offensive should be conducted methodically, that
its objective should be limited, and that it might be interrupted and
resumed as often as should seem advisable. The troops were engaged on
the 31st of July, and the first rush carried the French onward a
distance of 3 kilometers, not only to Steenstraete, which was the
objective, but further on to Bixchoote and the Korteker Tavern. The
British on their side had advanced 1500 yards over heavily fortified or
wooded ground, and their new line lay along Pilkem, Saint-Julien,
Frezenberg, Hooge, Sanctuary Wood, Hollebeke and Basse-Ville. Stormy
weather on the first of August, and German counter-attacks on
Saint-Julien, prevented an immediate continuation of the offensive, but
on August 16 a fresh advance took the French as far as Saint-Jansbeck,
while they seized the bridge-head of Drie Grachten. General Anthoine had
been so careful in his artillery preparation that one of the attacking
battalions had not a single casualty, and no soldier was even wounded.
The French then had to wait until the English had advanced in their turn
to the range of hillocks between Becelaere and Poelcapelle (September 20
and 26), but the brilliant British successes on those two dates were
making another collective operation possible; and this operation took
place on October 9, and gave the French possession of the outskirts of
Houthulst forest, while the British fought on till they captured the
Passchendaele hills.

Every great battle is now preceded and accompanied by a battle in the
air, because if chasing or bombarding squadrons did not police the air
before an attack, no photographs of the enemy's lines could be taken;
and if they did not afford protection for the observers while the troops
are engaged, the batteries would shoot and the infantry progress
blindly. It is not surprising, therefore, that the enemy, who could not
be deceived as to the importance of the French and British preparations
in Fl