essential alterations are at all wanting,
and that neither _now_ nor at _any_ time is it prudent or safe to be
meddling with the fundamental principles and ancient tried usages of our
Constitution,--that our representation is as nearly perfect as the
necessary imperfection of human affairs and of human creatures will
suffer it to be,--and that it is a subject of prudent and honest use and
thankful enjoyment, and not of captious criticism and rash experiment.

On the other side there are two parties, who proceed on two grounds, in
my opinion, as they state them, utterly irreconcilable. The one is
juridical, the other political. The one is in the nature of a claim of
right, on the supposed rights of man as man: this party desire the
decision of a suit. The other ground, as far as I can divine what it
directly means, is, that the representation is not so politically framed
as to answer the theory of its institution. As to the claim of _right_,
the meanest petitioner, the most gross and ignorant, is as good as the
best: in some respects his claim is more favorable, on account of his
ignorance; his weakness, his poverty, and distress only add to his
titles; he sues _in forma pauperis_; he ought to be a favorite of the
court. But when the _other_ ground is taken, when the question is
political, when a new constitution is to be made on a sound theory of
government, then the presumptuous pride of didactic ignorance is to be
excluded from the counsel in this high and arduous matter, which often
bids defiance to the experience of the wisest. The first claims a
personal representation; the latter rejects it with scorn and fervor.
The language of the first party is plain and intelligible; they who
plead an absolute right cannot be satisfied with anything short of
personal representation, because all _natural_ rights must be the rights
of individuals, as by _nature_ there is no such thing as politic or
corporate personality: all these ideas are mere fictions of law, they
are creatures of voluntary institution; men as men are individuals, and
nothing else. They, therefore, who reject the principle of natural and
personal representation are essentially and eternally at variance with
those who claim it. As to the first sort of reformers, it is ridiculous
to talk to them of the British Constitution upon any or upon all of its
bases: for they lay it down, that every man ought to govern, himself,
and that, where he cannot go, himself, he