unequal to Julian. By a
combination of courage, perseverance, and promptness, he brought the
entire contest to a favorable issue, and restored Persia, in A.D.
363, to a higher position than that from which she had descended two
generations earlier. If he had done nothing more than has already come
under our notice, he would still have amply deserved that epithet of
"Great" which, by the general consent of historians, has been assigned
to him. He was undoubtedly among the greatest of the Sassanian monarchs,
and may properly be placed above all his predecessors, and above all but
one of those who succeeded him.

CHAPTER XI.

_Attitude of Armenia during the War between Sapor and Julian. Sapor's
Treachery towards Arsaces. Sapor conquers Armenia. He attacks Iberia,
deposes Sauromaces, and sets up a new King. Resistance and Capture of
Artogerassa. Difficulties of Sapor. Division of Iberia between the Roman
and Persian Pretenders. Renewal of Hostilities between Rome and Persia.
Peace made with Valens. Death of Sapor. His Coins._

"Rex Persidis, longaevus ille Sapor, post imperatoris Juliani excessum
et pudendse pacis icta foedera . . . irqectabat Armeniae manum."--Amm.
Marc, xxvii. 18.

The successful issue of Sapor's war with Julian and Jovian resulted
in no small degree from the attitude which was assumed by Armenia soon
after Julian commenced his invasion. We have seen that the emperor,
when he set out upon his expedition, regarded Armenia as an ally, and in
forming his plans placed considerable dependence on the contingent which
he expected from Arsaces, the Armenian monarch. It was his intention to
attack Ctesiphon with two separate armies, acting upon two converging
lines. While he himself advanced with his main force by way of the
Euphrates valley and the Nahr-Malcha, he had arranged that his two
generals, Procopius and Sebastian, should unite their troops with those
of the Armenian king, and, after ravaging a fertile district of Media,
make their way towards the great city, through Assyria and Adiabene,
along the left bank of the Tigris. It was a bitter disappointment to him
when, on nearing Ctesiphon, he could see no signs and hear no tidings
of the northern army, from which he had looked for effectual aid at this
crisis of the campaign. We have now to consider how this failure came
about, what circumstances induced that hesitation and delay on the
part of Sebastian and Procopius which had at any rate