theorists account for the suffering by the ratio of the currency to
the population, claiming that a larger circulation of money will fill the
empty pockets of the needy, forgetting that money circulates only through
the very channels of trade which something else has stopped. It is quite
true that any financial legislation involving uncertain results
contributes materially to the doubt which stops the machinery. All efforts
to make money worth less by legislation have invariably extended the
period of hard times. Almost every conceivable cause has been assigned, or
given as a partial explanation, for the stagnation of trade. A careful
analysis of these recurring periods in the history of our country in 1837,
1848, 1857, 1873, 1887 and 1893, shows many partial causes of disaster in
exchange, affecting the peculiar nature of each panic, yet one especial
cause is evident in them all. That cause is large investment in fixed
capital from which no immediate returns can be expected.

_The chief causes of hard times._--Prior to 1837 there was a rapid
development of new country, as shown from the greatly increased receipts
for public lands. Every new home involves a permanent investment of
somebody's savings to the extent of at least $1,000. With the settlement
of every new region a considerable waste in real estate speculation is
found. A similar expansion of territory occupied by settlement immediately
followed the Mexican war, and was a chief cause of reduced capital and
consequent lack of employment.

The crisis of 1857 was preceded by enormous waste in the Crimean war. To
that was added the loss of a season's labor in a bad harvest and increase
of cost of living, reducing profits. The latter cause was incidental to
this particular season, but added materially to the suffering. In this
country there had also been an extensive enlargement in iron works and
woolen factories without corresponding products.

The panic of 1867, felt widely outside of America, was preceded by immense
waste of property in the civil war of the United States, a considerable
portion of which expense, on both sides, had been borne in Europe, either
during the war or immediately following, through the sale of bonds.

The panic of 1873 followed immense investments of wealth in fixed capital,
as illustrated in the Northern Pacific railroad, previously mentioned.
Between 1865 and 1873 30,000 miles of railroad were built in the United
States alone. This p