ity which, together with
the mental ability to understand what is needed, enables the commander
to bend events in conformity with his plan (page 47), or, where such
shaping of circumstances is infeasible, to ensure for his command
every possible advantage which can be obtained.

A recognized defect of certain forms of theoretical problems lies in
the fact that they indicate, themselves, the time when a Decision is
needed. In other words, they fail to vest the commander with
responsibility for the decision that the time has come for a Decision
to be made. Hence the great importance, from the viewpoint of timing,
of those problems and exercises which partake more fully of the
reality of war. The successful conduct of war, notwithstanding its
demand for utmost mental power, is founded predominantly on those
moral qualities (see pages 9 and 72) which spring less from the
intellect than from the will.

Problems Involving Modifications of the Basic Plan

Relatively minor deviations from decisions reached during the first
and second steps of the solution of a military problem are frequently
required during the action phase, because of incentives arising from
the demands of the situation. Such requirements will not occasion
serious dislocation in the predetermined effort of the competent
commander.

However, more momentous situations are also to be expected. These will
present new problems for the commander to solve. Such new problems, so
long as they do not challenge the integrity of the basic plan, will
not prevent the competent commander from proceeding with his
predetermined effort if he takes appropriate action in due time to
control the unfolding situation. To maintain such control may call for
the exercise of outstanding qualities of the mind and of the will.

For example, it is assumed that the commander's basic Decision was to
destroy an enemy convoy, the purpose of the Decision being to prevent
the convoy from reaching its destination. Now, it is supposed that,
during the supervision of the action planned for the destruction of
the enemy convoy, the commander receives information of a hostile
reinforcement. It is further supposed that this reinforcement, if it
joins the enemy convoy's escort, can jeopardize the success of the
basic plan.

The commander is now confronted with a serious situation which, if not
controlled by action of the right kind, at the right time, and at the
right place, may result in shat