sible situations when, for whatever reason, precise instructions
have not been issued.
The term "doctrine" is inappropriate as a description of the content
of orders or instructions prescribing specific methods of action for a
particular tactical operation in a situation existent or assumed under
circumstances of the moment. The precise instructions thus issued,
though they may be the result of doctrine, and may themselves
constitute a basis for development of doctrine, are manifestly of the
nature of something ordered rather than presented as authoritative
opinion.
In the broad field of the conduct of war, with its diversified
demands, a common viewpoint as to the application of fundamentals is
an essential to unity of effort. If the members of the military
profession have this common viewpoint, their reasoned beliefs as to
the best general methods of waging a particular war may be expected
more nearly to approach unanimity. The attainment of unity of effort
therefore calls for an understanding of fundamentals (page i), a basic
indoctrination which is not only sound but also common to all
commanders of the chain of command.
Wars come and go. Their effects are painful, but when their wounds are
healed mankind is prone to forget and to hope, even to assume, that
peace will henceforth be unbroken. Psychological and economic forces
then not infrequently impel the State to subordinate the national
defense in favor of other interests. During such periods the burdens
of command are enlarged. Its responsibility is not lessened, but the
means for effective discharge thereof are withheld.
The effective conduct of war thus requires that understanding exist
(see pages 9 and 10) between the civil representatives of the State
and the leaders of the armed forces in the coordination of policy with
the preparation and the use of power to enforce it. Of the leaders of
the armed forces, as a whole or in combinations, such conduct of war
demands the expression of the highest of human qualities, coupled with
intimate knowledge of fundamentals, an appreciation of the capacities
and limitations of the technique, and the ability to fit the
practical details into the general plan in their true relation
thereto.
The need for these qualities is manifestly not restricted to the hour
of supreme test, when the weapon of the State, the armed forces, is
wielded with hostile purpose. The forging of the weapon, and its
adequate preparation
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