ground. After marching between four and five
miles, well within the hour, we met the doctor of our mounted corps,
who said he had been taken prisoner and released, and that there was
no necessity for going any further, as our friends had beaten off our
enemies and were on their way back. So back we trudged too, meeting on
the way what most of us thought was a squadron of cavalry, but which
turned out to be Brigadier-General Little's cavalry brigade. The sight
of the attenuation of this force afforded us food for reflection, and
made some of us begin to understand a little how it was that, in spite
of our magnificent paper forces, we still found such difficulty in
rounding-up our foes.

The next three or four days were uneventful. Lord Kitchener arrived
and took over the chief command of all the forces, which now really
seemed to be closing in on De Wet. The noose was being drawn tighter
and tighter daily, and the Boers' position became more and more
precarious. What would have happened but for Lord Kitchener's arrival
it is hard to say, as General Hart, ever impatient of passivity, a
very Ney for pertinacity of attack, personal bravery, and confidence
in his troops, was undoubtedly on the eve of launching an attack. But
in the light of the succeeding events, it is clear now that such an
attack would have been premature and ill-timed. In the event of its
non-success--and we had a very small force to carry it out with--the
general operations would have been completely ruined, for we being
the Southern force, there would have been nothing to prevent De Wet
going south. In the event of success it would merely have meant that
the Boers would have slipped away north two or three days sooner than
they did, when, seeing that our arrangements to intercept them were
not even then complete, an earlier start would have enabled them to
carry out their retreat with even greater ease.

Major King, of General Hunter's staff, now arrived in camp with a Boer
prisoner, one of Prinsloo's staff. The latter was being sent through
with a message to De Wet, informing him of the full magnitude of the
Boer surrender at Golden Gate, and advocating his own relinquishment
of further operations. They went through to the Boers' position, and
were courteously received, but General De Wet declared it was
impossible for him to think of giving up now, as he had President
Steyn with him. Nobody believed in the excuse, and its purport is
somewhat diffic